by Mary Stata
Stories of hope abound in Africa. Mennonite Central Committee partners with communities and local organizations as they grow food, adapt to climate change, manage disease, and heal the wounds of war.
Despite these efforts to promote peace and economic development, the policies of the U.S. government all too often threaten to undermine the hard work of MCC’s partners. The activities of Africom, the U.S. military command for Africa, have proven to be particularly damaging. The following examines how and why the United States is expanding its military footprint in Africa.
U.S.-Africa Policy in Context
Historically at the bottom of the foreign policy heap, Africa often receives far less attention than the Middle East, Europe and other national security interests of the United States and the rest of the world. Throughout colonialism, Western powers treated the continent as territory to conquer and a source of lucrative natural resources, rather than as an equal economic and political partner.
World War II foreshadowed the swift wave of decolonization and independence that brought opportunities and pitfalls for the continent’s democratization and economic well-being. The simultaneous emergence of the Cold War soon took precedence, rather than efforts to strengthen struggling former colonies.
The tug-of-war between the U.S. and Soviet Union governed political relationships, alliances, and investments on the continent, at the cost of undermining democratic African governments. In sum, the West continued to benefit from Africa’s economic and political vulnerability.
The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new U.S. foreign policy. As rigid anti-Communist ideologies were deemed irrelevant, “national security” emerged as the pre-eminent foreign policy measuring stick. U.S. policy towards Africa was, therefore, largely seen as charity because the region held little national security relevance.
Meanwhile, detrimental trade and fiscal policies created by international financial institutions and the U.S. government wreaked havoc on the continent’s economic and political health. In addition to brutal civil wars and the explosion of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, poor governance plagued the continent’s overall development.
The global “war on terror” and access to oil governed U.S. foreign policy interests under the George W. Bush administration and resulted in military intervention and unilateralism. The Obama administration, by contrast, has advocated for a foreign policy that recognizes the need to work together with other countries to address issues such as climate change and infectious disease. In sum, this foreign policy is pragmatic and sympathetic to engagement.
After centuries of neglect, Africa is now emerging as a geo-politically and geo-strategically important region to the United States. Despite President Obama’s rhetoric about the importance of development and diplomacy in foreign policy, it is apparent that his administration is continuing to increase U.S. involvement on the continent through military training and assistance. Efforts to combat terrorism, oil interests, and competition between the U.S. and China for economic and political power, are at the roots of this interest.
Advent of Africom
Due to the establishment of Africom, the U.S. military’s Africa Command, in 2007, U.S. military activity now overshadows diplomacy and development in Africa. Formed under the Bush administration, Africom consolidates U.S. military operations in Africa under one military command. The establishment of this new command has led to suspicion from African governments and concern from civil society.
In general, with the exception of Liberia who offered to host Africom, African nations were afraid a U.S. military command on the continent would be a security risk to the host country and the region.
An additional concern is that Africom is part of a further militarization of America’s foreign policy. Africom is somewhat unique as a command because it was formed with the intention of embracing the 3D approach (prioritizing development and diplomacy, along with defense).
While other U.S. commands have some degree of civilian integration, Africom is intended to reflect the 3D mission of current U.S. foreign policy by integrating staff from the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other government agencies into its structure. But the precedence of defense over development and diplomacy in Africom means that instability in Africa will be handled primarily through military “solutions” that fail to get to the root causes of the instability.
Because Africom seeks to combine military and civilian operations, the roles of military and civilians are blurred. In addition to sending a confusing message to African civilians, this approach puts development and humanitarian workers at risk of attack by insurgent forces since their work is no longer viewed as neutral.
Past U.S. military assistance in the continent has often made conflict worse. Now that the command brings together U.S. military operations in Africa and comes with an increased budget, it is likely that U.S. military assistance and intervention will increase, but will not be any more effective in mitigating conflict and encouraging good governance than it has in the past.
Africom and Operation Lightning Thunder
For the past 23 years, Northern Uganda, and more recently neighboring countries, have experienced conflict and turmoil at the hands of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group. The LRA is responsible for murdering civilians indiscriminately, maiming victims, and abducting children. As far as rebel groups go, the nature of this conflict has been as ruthless as they come.
After losing patience in a peace process widely accepted as responsible for Northern Uganda’s current stability, the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) teamed up with armies from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan in late 2008, promising to rout the LRA and free abducted civilians once and for all.
This joint offensive, dubbed Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT), was widely condemned as a failure. It failed to apprehend top LRA commanders, resulted in vicious backlash attacks on civilians, and caused the violence to spread to neighboring areas that previously were not affected, displacing thousands. This operation marked Africom’s inaugural activity on the continent, since they provided technical and logistical assistance to the UPDF.
The UPDF are still receiving substantial support from Africom to actively pursue the LRA across central Africa. Training and equipping African armies for military operations, and then failing to take responsibility for the results of those operations, shows that there is little accountability for the actions of the new command.
Congress recently passed legislation (H.R. 2478/S. 1067) that has the potential to spur development and promote healing and reconciliation in Northern Uganda. However, this bill also requires the Obama administration to develop “an interagency framework to plan, coordinate, and review diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military elements of United States policy across the region regarding the Lord’s Resistance Army.”
Given the current realities of U.S. foreign policy, military mechanisms–including Africom–are privileged over diplomatic avenues or development efforts. A military operation aimed at the LRA is not a new strategy.
Since OLT, the LRA have decentralized into small bands of soldiers that operate in three separate countries. This makes a targeted military option nearly impossible, given the challenging terrain and the number of splintered LRA groups that now operate. Secondly, the Ugandan government last year arrested individuals accused of organizing a new rebel group within the country. Additionally, the LRA’s financial supporters remain unknown. These reasons illustrate that no quick fix exists.
Change is Possible
The Obama administration is increasing Africom’s budget and expanding military assistance and training programs to African countries. Africom’s formidable budget and number of personnel far outweigh that of the State Department and USAID.
This imbalance of resources not only runs the risk of over-militarizing small and underdeveloped nations, but also becomes the face of U.S. foreign policy for Africa. Privileging military expansion over investment in sustainable economic development ensures a continuation of the colonial cycle of poverty and insecurity for the peoples of Africa. The United States must dramatically change its current policy course for Africa by heavily investing in programs that promote democracy, human rights, and economic wellbeing.
